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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC INTEREST
LAWYERING
In the study of comparative law, a central concept is that of
functionality: the different ways that the laws and legal systems
of different countries attempt to deal with the same problems.1
One such problem is the provision of legal services to persons
who are unable to retain a private lawyer. Every society that is
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A. University
of California (Berkeley), 1955; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1958. A shorter version of
this Article was presented at Conference XXXII of the Inter-American Bar Associa-
tion, in Quito, Ecuador, in November, 1995. The author wishes to express special
appreciation for the support provided for his research by West Virginia University's
Regional Research Institute, where he is a Faculty Research Associate.
The author obtained the articles from La Jornada (Mexico City) cited
throughout this Article without reference to specific pages over the Chiapas-1 and
Mexico2000 electronic bulletin boards, which are managed by PROFMEX, a world-
wide consortium of social scientists interested in Mexican public policy issues. Infor-
mation about PROFMEX may be obtained from Robert Gibson, Central Contact Of-
fice Director, UCLA Program on Mexico. The articles in the original Spanish were
placed on the bulletin boards by Peter Rashkin (cortes@kaiwan.com), who transferred
them electronically from La Jornada's World Wide Web home page:
(http:serpiente.dgsca.unam.mx/jornada/index.html).
1. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, 1 INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 31 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987).
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committed to the legal equality of its citizens must find a way to
provide legal assistance to persons who lack sufficient financial
resources to engage legal counsel. And every society that is com-
mitted to the rule of law must find a way to provide representa-
tion to those citizens whose legal rights are being violated by
government officials, political figures, economic interests, or
criminal enterprises so powerful that private attorneys hesitate
to oppose them.
Both the United States and Mexico profess commitments to
the legal equality of their citizens and to the rule of law. The
American commitments are expressed most dramatically in the
legend chiseled into the facade of the Supreme Court building in
Washington, D.C.: "Equal Justice Under Law." The Mexican
Constitution guarantees access to justice for everyone,2 and
states that no person or corporation is exempt from the law.3
The firmness of these professed commitments is question-
able. In the United States, legislation prohibits lawyers in feder-
ally-funded programs that serve the poor from representing
women who want to challenge restrictive abortion laws.4 Cur-
rent efforts in Congress to bar these same legal services lawyers
from challenging new limitations on social welfare benefits and
regulations affecting illegal immigrants and prisoners5 seem to
reflect a view that such laws should be immune from constitu-
tional scrutiny.6 With respect to Mexico, a very well-informed
American lawyer concluded in 1994 that "[t]he persistence of
widespread human rights violations in Mexico and the impunity
with which such violations are committed contradict the stated
commitment of the Mexican government and President Salinas
to improve human rights practices."7
2. CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE Los ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 17, 1 2.
3. Id. art. 13.
4. Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996(b)(8) (1994).
5. See Conferees Settle on $278 Million for LSC - Administration Veto Likely,
UPDATE (Project Advisory Group, National Organization of Legal Services Programs)
Dec. 5, 1995, attachment; Laurie D. Zelon, Changes in Law Demand Push from
Private Bar, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15, 1996, at BS.
6. "What baffles and angers Legal Services' critics is that Congress subsidizes
lawsuits to undermine the kinds of welfare reforms it claims to support." Carl
Horowitz, Welfare Reform: Like a Rorschach Inkblot Test, The Term Evokes a Host of
Interpretations, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, July 24, 1995, at Al.
7. Raul M. Sanchez, Mexico's Governmental Human Rights Commissions: An




This Article, however, assumes that the commitments are
serious, and goes on to look, first, at the different ways in which
the two countries have sought to make available what we in the
United States call public interest lawyering, and, second, at the
probable future development of such lawyering in Mexico.
II. U.S. RELIANCE ON THE PRIVATE BAR
In the United States, the primary responsibility for securing
equal justice under the law has traditionally rested, and rests
today, on the over seventy percent of American lawyers in pri-
vate practice' and on the organized bar associations to which
they belong. Indeed, a textbook assigned at many American law
schools asserts that, "[t]he legal profession in the United States
has regarded itself, uniquely among legal professions in the
world, as charged with a responsibility to provide legal assis-
tance to the poor."9
Two moral bases underlie the professional responsibility of
private lawyers in the U.S. to provide legal assistance to those
who might not otherwise receive it. First, American lawyers
consider themselves officers of courts that are committed to
administering justice." In an adversarial system of litigation in
which the primary responsibility for discovering evidence and
legal authority is vested in lawyers, it is very difficult for a court
to be sure it is doing justice if one of the parties has no legal
assistance."
Second, American lawyers have long held a broad monopoly,
not only over representing parties in court but also over giving
out-of-court legal advice. Selective standards for admission to
law school and state examinations for admission to the bar limit
the number of persons who may practice law. Thus, American
lawyers are deemed to owe special obligations to society as a
quid pro quo for their exclusive privileges. 2
8. See BARBARA A. CuRRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990'S 7 (1994).
9. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
1043 (2d ed. 1994).
10. Id.
11. See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049,
1059 (1970).
12. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Lawyer's Pro Bono Public Responsibility,
1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 14-18; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON
1995-96] 345
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
With respect to legal services for the poor, many poor crimi-
nal defendants are represented by public defenders who are full-
time employees of federal or state governments."3 A few federal
and state agencies charged with administering particular laws,
such as those against discrimination by private employers on the
basis of race or sex, provide legal assistance to persons claiming
that their legal rights have been violated. Some 4000 lawyers -
a very small number - are employed by independent local legal
services programs that receive funding from the federal govern-
ment to provide civil (non-criminal) legal services to the poor.1
4
Much of the burden of representing poor criminal defen-
dants is borne, however, by lawyers in private practice who are
appointed and paid by the courts to represent defendants in
particular cases; lawyers generally may not refuse such appoint-
ments. 5 On the initiative of state bar associations (to which
lawyers usually must belong), federally-funded legal services
programs also receive financial support from the interest that
accrues on client funds held by private lawyers for short periods
of time.16 These programs also draw upon the services of many
private lawyers who have agreed to represent referrals from the
programs without charge.17 Law school clinical education pro-
grams that serve actual clients are frequently oriented toward
serving the poor and are taught by deeply committed, full-time
professors.'8
The American Bar Association (ABA), a voluntary associa-
tion comprising about forty percent of the country's lawyers,"9
PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKIN-
DLING OF LAWYER'S PROFESSIONALISM (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 261-62
(1987).
13. In 1991, 8816 lawyers, or 1.1% of the U. S. total were employed by either
public defender offices or non-government legal aid agencies. See CURRAN & CARSON,
supra note 8, at 7.
14. See HAZARD, supra note 9, at 1045.
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1983).
16. See HAZARD, supra note 9, at 592-93.
17. In West Virginia, for example, over 730 lawyers have signed up for the
State Bar's Pro Bono Referral Project and agreed to take at least one pro bono case
each year. See Thomas V. Flaherty, President's Page, W. VA. LAW., Jan. 1996, at 4,
5.
18. See REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFES-
SION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT -
AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 54, 247 (1992).
19. In 1994-95, the American Bar Association membership was 339,476. See Na-
tional Declines, Local Growth, NATL L.J., Jan. 15, 1996, at A22. There were approxi-
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20strongly supports federal funding for legal services programs.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, recommended by the
ABA for adoption by the states, suggest that every lawyer aspire
to provide at least fifty hours per year of no-fee or reduced-fee
legal services and make financial contributions to legal services
programs. 21 It is widely assumed that anticipated cutbacks in
federal funding for legal services programs will lead to some
expansion in organized volunteer services by private lawyers,22
and perhaps even to state requirements that lawyers perform
such services.23
Over the course of American history, labor union leaders,
political radicals, African-Americans and some criminal defen-
dants charged with shocking crimes have at times encountered
great difficulty in obtaining legal representation. 4 However,
the official position of the organized bar is expressed in an earli-
er ABA code of ethics adopted by practically every state: "Re-
gardless of... personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline
representation because a client or a cause is unpopular or com-
munity reaction is adverse."25 The current Model Rules encour-
age such representation by informing the public that "[a]
lawyer's representation of a client ... does not constitute an
endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral
views or activities."
26
Today it seems unlikely that anyone in the United States
would have difficulty obtaining representation from the private
bar merely because he or she is challenging the government or
other powerful interest. This is the result of many factors, in-
cluding the increased size of, and economic competition within,
mately 875,000 lawyers in the U.S. in 1995. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (6th ed.
1995).
20. See 11 LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA), CURRENT REPORTS, No.
15, Aug. 23, 1995, at 251.
21. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983).
22. See, e.g., Robert N. Weiner, Heeding the Call to Fill Service Gap, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 15, 1996, at B7.
23. See, e.g., Point, Counter Point: Should Providing Pro Bono Legal Services Be
Mandatory? (Yes: Richard Lee; No: Pauline Gee), CAL. B.J., Aug. 1995, at 12.
24. See VERN COUNTRYMAN & TED FINMAN, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY
576-94 (1966); see generally Michael E. Tigar, Essay, Defending, 74 TEX. L. REV. 101
(1995).
25. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-27 (1969).
26. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1983).
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the legal profession since the 1960s.27 Other factors include the
increased racial and gender diversity in the profession, the in-
creased number of law practices that cross state lines, the politi-
cal and ideological fragmentation of the American body politic,
the lure of media celebrity for lawyers who take on controversial
cases, and laws that allow the recovery of attorney's fees against
certain unsuccessful governmental and private defendants.
I do not suggest that the picture in the United States is a
satisfactory one, especially for the poor. Only when threatened
with incarceration do the poor have a right to publicly-funded
legal representation," and the private bar has simply not done
enough to make up for meager governmentally funded services.
Studies show that only about fifteen to twenty percent of the
legal needs of the poor are now being met.29 With respect to
opposing powerful interests, no one knows how the private bar
in the U.S. would respond to, for example, the threats of physi-
cal harm or harassment that confront lawyers in other coun-
tries 0 and some doctors who perform abortions in the United
States itself. Increasing competition from non-lawyers in provid-
ing legal services,"1 in addition to increasing numbers of law-
yers themselves, could well undermine the exclusive privilege
basis for obligations of public service.
III. MEXICAN RELIANCE ON GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Whether or not any surveys of the legal needs of Mexico's
poor have been completed, I met no one during my research in
27. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 2 (stating that in 1995 there
were 2 112 times the number of lawyers there were in 1970).
28. See HAZARD, supra note 9, at 1035-36.
29. See REPORT OF THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS' PUBLIC SER-
VICE RESPONSIBILITY, ET AL. (1993), quoted in STEPHEN GILLER & ROY D. SIMON,
JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 263, 265 (1994).
30. See, e.g., Lawyers Drop Case After Threat in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
1995, at A7. Even in the U.S., some criminal defense lawyers believe that federal
prosecutors are using attorney's fee forfeiture proceedings and other forms of alleged
harassment to carry on a "war" against the defense bar. See Michael Checcio, Para-
noid or Persecuted?, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1994, at 44. Also, prior sex offenders who may
be subject to a New Jersey law requiring that residents of their communities be
notified of their criminal records have experienced difficulty in obtaining legal repre-
sentation. See Robert Hanley, 'Megans Law' Leaves New Jersey Lawyers in a Tough
Spot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995, at A9.
31. See ABA COMMISSION ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN
LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (June, 1995).
[Vol. 27:2348
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Mexico during the summers of 1993 and 1994 who believed that
their needs were being adequately met, or who did not believe
that opponents of the government or powerful private interests
frequently faced real problems in obtaining legal assistance.32
But if Mexico falls short of meeting its constitutional commit-
ments, its shortcomings are quite distinct from those of the
United States. In Mexico, the primary responsibility for public
interest lawyering rests with lawyers employed by the govern-
ment. According to one estimate, about half of Mexico's lawyers
are employed by federal, state, and local governments,33 versus
approximately thirteen percent in the U.S. 3'
Some government lawyers in Mexico represent the poor in
judicial proceedings. At the federal level, only criminal defen-
dants are provided with defensores de oficio.3 5 Conversely, in
the Federal District of Mexico City the poor can also receive the
help of defensores in civil, family, labor, and landlord/tenant
matters.6 Other lawyers are employed by the government to
enforce labor and agrarian reform laws by hearing complaints
against employers and landowners and attempting to resolve
32. These observations about the Mexican legal system, and a number of others
to follow, are based wholly or in part (in addition to published sources) on the
author's interviews with Mexican lawyers, judges, legal educators, social scientists,
and human rights advocates. While the atmosphere for criticism of the system
seemed relatively open in the summers of 1993 and 1994, the still unsolved June,
1995 killing of a Mexico City judge who had complained publicly about political
pressure has doubtless created tension and some concern about reprisals in the legal
community. See Tim Golden, Mexico Judge in Union Case is Shot Dead, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1995, at A7. See also U. S. Citizen Cited to Leave the Schedule [sic]; Will
Ask for a Review of His Case; Another 20 Foreigners Have Been Pressured, LA
JORNADA (Mexico City), Jan. 15, 1996 (Chris Ames trans.) (reporting alleged govern-
ment intimidation of lawyer in state of Chiapas who was representing American
filmmaker threatened with expulsion from Mexico). Therefore, the author does not
attribute negative comments to particular interviewees.
33. See PETER S. CLEAVES, PROFESSIONS AND THE STATE: THE MEXICAN CASE
16 (1987) (estimating that the Mexican legal profession is "split more or less evenly
between the state and private sectors."). According to Dr. Miguel Acosta Romero, an
authority on the legal profession in Mexico, reliable statistics on the number of law-
yers pursuing different careers are not available. Letter from Dr. Miguel Acosta,
Law Faculty Member, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (on file with au-
thor).
34. See CURRAN & CARSON, supra note 8, at 7.
35. See LUIS RUBIO ET AL., A LA PUERTA DE LA LEY: EL ESTADO DE DERECHO
EN MEXICO, capt. IV (1994).
36. See Esperanza Barajas Urias, Sin titulo, la mayorta de quienes representan
a los pobres en juicios, LA JORNADA (Mexico City), Aug. 14, 1995. The information
about labor cases was obtained from an interview with Dra. Alicia Elena Perez
Duarte, a judge and legal educator in Mexico City.
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disputes through negotiations or administrative procedures.37 A
National Human Rights Commission investigates complaints of
official misconduct and makes recommendations to state and
federal authorities concerning whether to prosecute or conduct
further investigations.38 Some government lawyers (including
lawyers for the Solidaridad development program and others
employed by the governing PRI party) staff legal advice offices,
but do not participate in legal proceedings.3"
These government programs are rife with problems. For one,
salaries are very low." Some defensores in Mexico City are paid
only about twenty-five percent of what a private practitioner
would receive to handle a similar case.41 Such low earnings
lead many lawyers to accept paying cases on the side, to channel
potential paying clients to their friends in the private bar, to
accept monetary tokens of "appreciation" from the families of
poor clients, and to extort small sums for performing routine
minor services."
In addition, the workloads of defensores are often unman-
ageable. Some defensores in Mexico City are expected to handle
as many as a hundred cases at a time. Consequently, little or
nothing is accomplished for many clients.'3 Government law-
yers often lack adequate office space, equipment, and secretarial
assistance." Government service tends to attract mostly youn-
ger lawyers, who lack practical training and are often not fully
qualified licenciados,"' having not completed a required thesis
or passed a comprehensive examination." Many lawyers imme-
diately leave government practice when they find a position in
37. See CLEAVES, supra note 33, at 92. See also Stephen Zamora, The Ameri-
canization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 24 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 391, 446 (1993).
38. See Sanchez, supra note 7, at 1052.
39. Interviews with Dra. Alicia Elena Perez Duarte, Magistrada, Tribunal Supe-
rior de Justicia del Distrito Federal, in Mexico City (Aug., 18, 1994), and others.
40. See RUBIO ET AL., supra note 35, capt. IV.
41. See Barajas Urias, supra note 36.
42. Id.
43. Id. See also RuBIo ET AL., supra note 35, capt. IV.
44. Id.
45. See Barajas Urias, supra note 36. After three years of study, Mexican law
students can litigate civil cases and misdemeanors. See Fred V. Perry, Understand-
ing the Mexican Attorney, 10 INT'L LAW., 167, 173 (1976). Most students do not grad-
uate, and many who do not finish go into the civil service. Id. at 173.
46. See James E. Herget & Jorge Camil, The Legal System of Mexico, in MOD-




In the comprehensive code of ethics adopted by the Barra
Mexicana de Abogados," Mexican lawyers in private practice
are exhorted, much like their U.S. counterparts, to represent
indigents without charge,49 and not to let their decisions to ac-
cept or reject cases be affected by the power or wealth of the
opposition.5 ° These are not binding obligations, however,5 and
only a small percentage of Mexican lawyers belong to the Barra
Mexicana or other bar associations, 2 which are generally
viewed by lawyers in both large and small firms as more focused
on obtaining political advancement and government jobs for
their members than with upgrading legal skills or improving the
legal system.5" A prominent human rights advocate told me
that the last time the bar associations took a position against
the government was in 1944, on its treaty-making powers.
Furthermore, legal education in most of Mexico's universi-
ties has offered little support for public interest lawyering. The
traditional curriculum, developed at the Universidad Nacional
Aut6noma de Mxico (UNAM) in 1907, is highly theoretical, and
divorced from the practicalities of the legal profession and the
realities of Mexican society.' Faculties consist mainly of practi-
tioners who teach part-time (but still theoretically)55 and do not
wish to lose clients or opportunities for political advancement by
taking controversial positions. Students often spend their obliga-
tory six months of social service in government departments far
removed from the problems of the poor, or in law school clinical
programs (bufetes jurdicos) where faculty supervisors provide
47. See Barajas Urias, supra note 36.
48. See Eugenio Ursua-Cocke & William P. McPherson, El Papel del Abogado
en Mexico, 14 REVISTA DE INVESTIGACIONES JURDICAs 419, 437 (1990).
49. Id. at 442.
50. Id. at 441.
51. See Pedro G. Zorrilla Martinez & Manuel Gonzales Oropeza, Licensing At-
torneys in Mexico 4-5 (unpublished manuscript submitted to the January 1995 Annu-
al Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, on file with author).
52. See id. at 3 (stating that only 2000 lawyers nationally belong to the five
recognized associations); Herget & Camil, supra note 46. As of 1987, Mexico had
311,572 fully qualified lawyers (a great many do not actually practice). See Ray
August, The Mythical Kingdom of Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 72, 73.
53. See CLEAVES, supra note 33, at 66.
54. See Artemio Roque Alvarez, Los abogados del futuro, EL NACIONAL,
INSTANCIA (Mexico City), July 7, 1992 at 5; Perry, supra note 45, at 171-74; Herget
& Camil, supra note 46, at 1.30.61-65.
55. See Herget & Camil, supra note 46, at 1.30.64.
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little real training and occasionally attempt to charge clients.5 6
With no appreciable participation or financial support from
.the bar as a whole 7 - Mexicans themselves note the absence
of any real tradition of charitable giving 8 - the burden within
the private sector of providing competent and honest legal assis-
tance to the urban poor, campesinos, and indigenous peoples,
and of opposing the government and other powerful interests
has been assumed by a very small interlocking network of law-
yers in private practice, lawyers for non-governmental organi-
zations, and legal academicians who provide as much of the re-
quired service as they can. This group probably still numbers no
more than a thousand nationwide.
The umbrella organization for these lawyers is the
Asociaci6n Nacional de Abogados Democrdticos (ANAD), estab-
lished in 1991."9 As of 1993, ANAD comprised about 250 mem-
bers in Mexico City and another 200 in twelve of Mexico's thirty-
one states.6 0 Since winning its first fight with the government
over the inclusion of the word "democrdtico" in its title (which
the government initially declared could only be used by a politi-
cal party)," ANAD has opposed the government on such issues
as NAFTA and the privatization of collective farms and govern-
ment enterprises. It advocates greater independence for the
official Human Rights Commission, 2 better training and higher
pay for defensores de oficio,"3 and more vigorous investigations
of corruption in the judicial system.'
56. Interviews in June, 1993 and Aug. 1994.
57. "Se puede concluir . . . que los juristas no han aportado su colaboraci6n a
la busqueda de la justicia, el pretendido primer prop6sito de su profesion." Ursua-
Cocke & McPherson, supra note 48, at 425. In English: "One could con-
clude . . . that the attorneys have not contributed their participation to the search
for justice, supposedly the primary purpose of their profession."
58. See Judith Bicknell, From Handouts to Self-Help, EL FINANCIERO (Int'l Ed.),
Aug. 15-21, 1994, at 10.
59. See Encuentro Nacional de Abogados Democrdticos (Oct. 17-20, 1991) (report
published by Instituto Latino Americano de Servicios Legales Alternativos) [hereinaf-
ter 1991 ANAD Encuentro].
60. Interview with Lic. Jesus Campos Linas, President, Asociaci6n Nacional de
Abogados DemocrAticos, in Mexico City (June 21, 1993).
61. PRIMER INFORME ANUAL QUE EL CONSEJO NACIONAL RINDE A LA ASAMBLEA
GENERAL DE LA ASOCIACION NACIONAL DE ABOGADOS DEMOCRATICOS 1-2 (1992)
[hereinafter ANAD PRIMER INFORME].
62. Id. at 2-3, 7.
63. See Barajas Urias, supra note 36.
64. See 1991 ANAD Encuentro, supra note 59, at 54-55.
[Vol. 27:2352
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Affiliated with ANAD are four other non-governmental orga-
nizations. El Despacho de Orientaci6n y Asesoria Legal (DOAL)
in Mexico City has four lawyers and two paralegals and offers
public legal education publications and training programs
throughout the country concerning the rights of criminal defen-
dants, workers, tenants, debtors, and citizens in general.65
Mujeres en Acci6n Sindical (MAS) is another Mexico City
group that began by organizing and representing the employ-
ment problems of women workers and is currently handling
women's family law problems - especially domestic violence.
With only three lawyers and some volunteer paralegals, MAS is
fairly overwhelmed as it handles seventy to eighty new cases
each month.6 There is also a Red (network) Nacional de
Abogadas Feministas, but as of 1993 it had only about twenty
members, mostly in Mexico City. 7
Tierra y Libertad is basically a one-woman office in Mexico
City that seeks to organize and represent groups of campesinos
all around the country, especially in response to the
government's efforts to privatize collective farms.68 (As in other
developing countries, it is extremely difficult to get lawyers into
the countryside, where conditions are rough and a great deal of
travel is required.) Chiltak,69 an organization located in
Chiapas"0 and staffed by a single lawyer, advises groups of
campesinos and indigenous peoples. It also trains non-lawyer
advocates from these communities, some of whom have been ap-
pointed municipal judges.71
65. Interview with Lic. Ernestina Godoy, Lawyer with El Despacho de
Orientaci6n y Asesoria Legal (DOAL), in Mexico City (June 21, 1993). See also
DOAL, DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJo PARA EL INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS, SAN JOSE DE COSTA RICA 1993 (on file with author).
66. Interview with Lic. Claudia Barron, Lawyer with Mujeres en Acci6n
Sindical, in Mexico City (July 5, 1993). See also MUJERES TRABAJADORAS UNIDAS -
MAS, PRESENTACI6N (undated) (on file with author).
67. DIRECTORIO RED NACIONAL DE ABOGADAS FEMINISTAS (undated) (on file
with author).
68. Tierra y Libertad is led by Lic. Barbara Zamora Lopez. See Barbara
Zamora Lopez, Actividades Realizadas: Bufete Juridico "Tierra y Libertad," in ANAD
PRIMER INFORME, supra note 61, at 21-23.
69. Chiltak means compaheros in the Tzotzil language.
70. The Zapatista uprising occurred in Chiapas in 1995. Chiltak's headquarters
are located in San Cristobal de Las Casas, Chiapas.
71. Interview with Lic. Javier Valdiviezo, Lawyer for Chiltak, in San Cristobal
de las Casas (Aug. 11, 1994).
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Further, the unofficial Comisi6n Mdxicana de Defensa y
Promoci6n de los Derechos Humanos employs two lawyers to
investigate human rights abuses throughout the country and to
advise local organizations.72
While most of these organizations publicly assert their inde-
pendence from political affiliation, some appear very closely
identified with the left-of-center PRD opposition party. Indeed,
upon my visit the only way to identify the DOAL office was by a
PRD sticker at the entrance to its building. The Chiltak office
also served as the San Cristobal de las Casas headquarters of
the Zapatistas' Convenci6n Nacional Democrdtica.
IV. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING IN MEXICO
From time to time, proposals are made to transform public
interest lawyering in Mexico in ways that closely resemble the
U.S. system. For example, in a recent study of the Mexican legal
system, A La Puerta de la Ley, El Estado de Derecho en Mexico,
the distinguished political scientist Luis Rubio and his col-
leagues urged the creation of a national U.S.-style system of
legal representation and advice for the poor that would be pub-
licly funded, but independent of the courts and of any other
governmental unit.73 In 1993, the presidents of ten Mexican bar
associations signed an agreement to jointly promote public
knowledge of the law and the legal system (albeit in a joint
effort with the government to control crime).74 In August, 1995,
both a prominent official of the governing PRI party and a PRI
legislator were reported to say that the law should ideally obli-
gate all lawyers to take some cases free of charge.75
The moral foundations for the professional responsibility of
private practitioners in the U.S. to contribute services are still
72. Interview with Mtra. Mariclaire Acosta Urquidi, President, Comisidn
Mdxiana de Defensa y Promocidn de los Derechos Humanos, in Mexico City (July 8,
1993). See Mariclaire Acosta Urquidi, Informe General de labores que rinde la
presidenta de la Comisidn Mdxicana de Defensa y Promoci6n de los Derechos
Humanos a la Segunda Asamblea General Ordinaria de Miembros (Feb. 1990 - June
1992) (on file with author).
73. See RUBIO ET AL., supra note 35, capt. IV.
74. See Reunidn de Diego Valadds con abogados; Sehala la PGJDF la necesidad
de cultura juridica en los ciudadanos, LA JORNADA (Mexico City), June 28, 1993, at
19.
75. See Barajas Urias, supra note 36.
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largely lacking in Mexico. In Mexico's investigatory system of
litigation, lawyers play a much less central role than in an ad-
versarial regime. There are no jury trials - assistant judges
rather than lawyers question witnesses, rules of evidence are
not strictly followed, and there is no cross-examination of wit-
nesses. The assistant judges prepare written summaries of the
evidence which usually become the basis of the principal judge's
decision. In criminal cases lawyers make their closing argu-
ments only in writing."6
Furthermore, unlike American lawyers who enjoy exclusive
privileges, Mexican lawyers do not have a monopoly on giving
out-of-court legal advice, and less than fully qualified licenciados
are permitted to litigate many kinds of cases." Nor is there
much selectivity in law school admissions. There are nearly 120
recognized public and private law schools in Mexico,7" and
UNAM alone has an enrollment of 10,000 law students.79 One
thoughtful observer of the professions in Mexico, Peter Cleaves,
has written that in an effort to keep bright young people off the
labor market and out of political trouble, "[t]he state finds it
cheaper to build a classroom and hire a teacher than to con-
struct a factory."0 Moreover, law graduates do not have to pass
an additional state licensure examination.81 As a result, on a
per capita basis Mexico may have as many as a third more fully
qualified lawyers than the United States82 (doubtless far fewer
actually practice at any one time) - with all that must mean to
individual lawyers in terms of not feeling especially privileged.
Mexico's severe inequalities of wealth' and the fact that
its middle class constitutes only a quarter to a third of the
population" limit in several ways what one may expect from
76. See Paul Bernstein, El Derecho y El Hecho: Law and Reality in the Mexican
Criminal Justice System, 8 CHICANO L. REV. 40, 54 (1985); Herget & Camil, supra
note 46, at 1.30.53-54; Perry, supra note 45, at 172, 175-76.
77. See supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text.
78. See Zorilla Martinez & Gonzalez Oropeza, supra note 51, at 1.
79. See id. at 3.
80. CLEAVES, supra note 33, at 44.
81. See Herget & Camil, supra note 46, at 1.30.65.
82. See August, supra note 52, at 73.
83. See Sergio Sarmiento, La evasiva igualidad, REFORMA (Mexico City), Nov.
17, 1994, at A8.
84. See Jorge G. Castaneda, Ferocious Differences, ATL. MONTHLY, July 1995, at
68, 71. See also DAVID E. LOURY, THE RISE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY MEXICO 191 (1992).
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the private bar by way of public interest lawyering. First, most
lawyers probably do not feel secure enough economically to fore-
go income or risk making powerful enemies."5 Second, the ab-
sence of a larger middle class means the absence of what an
English writer on Mexico, Sybille Bedford, referred to as "the
exercise of pressure through disinterested moral criticism dis-
tinct from any direct prerogative.""6 Instead, when it comes to
controversial issues, most Mexicans, including Mexican lawyers,
are likely to think they have too much to lose to take positions
that might prove contrary to their own interests."7 Thirdly, the
relatively small Mexican middle-class has probably obtained a
measure of justice through traditional networks of personal
connections, rather than developing more effective impersonal
legal mechanisms, including litigation.8
Since choosing sides on many controversial legal issues in
Mexico unavoidably means choosing political sides, efforts to
truly "separate law from politics" will in the short term probably
achieve little success. For example, in one embarrassing 1993
incident, a seemingly non-political full-page newspaper adver-
tisement appeared protesting proposals to expand the
government's arrest and wiretapping powers. The advertisement
bore the signatures or endorsements of many distinguished
lawyers, human rights advocates and organizations. However, it
erroneously contained the logo of the opposition PRD party and
was reprinted the next day without the logo. 9 One might hope
that at least within the major political parties lawyers would
consider joining together to form specifically identified legal
groups,9 ° as is done within the major parties in Great Brit-
85. Several legal educators stressed to the author the concerns of their students
about getting into, or staying in, the middle class.
86. SYBILLE BEDFORD, A VISIT TO DON OTTAVIO: A MEICAN JOuRNEY 191
(1953).
87. The right-of-center PAN opposition party seeks to reassure government em-
ployees that if elected it would not reduce the civil service, and the left-of-center
PRD opposition party seeks to reassure the business community that it would not
re-nationalize banks.
88. Cf. ALAN RIDING, DISTANT NEIGHBORS 113 (1984) (stressing that in Mexico
the impersonality of law has to contend with "the powerful and traditional impor-
tance of status and personal connections.").
89. Compare LA JORNADA (Mexico City), June 29, 1993, at 16, with LA
JORNADA (Mexico City), June 30, 1993, at 15.
90. The author was told by one legal educator that while lawyers have tradi-
tionally been leaders within the governing PRI party, they often feel they can be
more influential if they do not "talk like lawyers."
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ain. The groups could formulate and publish party legal mani-
festos taking positions somewhat less partisan and more sensi-
tive to the legal needs of Mexican society as a whole than those
that the party might otherwise espouse. In this connection, it
was very encouraging when a prominent human rights advocate
praised the human rights positions of a group of lawyers from
the right-of-center PAN party.
More broadly, any assessment of the future of public inter-
est lawyering in Mexico must take account of that country's long
tradition of reliance on the state for social advancement. This
stems from the idea that "only the state. .. [has] an unbiased
conception of the general interest and the common good."92
While a recent Economist survey highlighted "the emergence of
ever more independent voices, pressure groups and grass-roots
organisations,"3 an observant American law professor, Stephen
Zamora, reminds us that for all those Mexicans who would pre-
fer a government that ensured greater economic and political
freedom, "an equal number of Mexicans would prefer a radically
different model, with vigorous governmental controls operating
to remove the pronounced economic and social inequities that
exist in the country."94 Indeed, in a recent poll only forty-nine
percent of Mexicans favored a democratic form of government, as
compared, for example, with eighty percent of Uruguayans and
seventy-six percent of Argentineans.95
Against this background, Cleaves has concluded that "[iut is
illusory for professionals to think of challenging state power in
direct confrontation."6 This seems particularly true of Mexico's
fragmented bar: "[In Mexico, one generally speaks of the legal
91. See, e.g., Editorial: A Conservative Approach, 137 NEW L.J. 353 (1987).
92. ROBERTO NEWELL & Luis RUBIO, MExIcO'S DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ORI-
GINS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS 65 (1984), quoted in Zamora, supra note 37, at 441.
93. A Survey of Mexico, ECONOMIST, (Special Insert), Oct. 28, 1995, at 8 [here-
inafter Economist Survey].
94. Stephen T. Zamora, Forward: Searching for the Mexican Model of Govern-
ment, 12 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 181, 185-86 (1990). Even the Economist found that,
"Mexicans, though disillusioned by their politicians' recent performance, still look
first to the central authority for solutions to all kinds of problems. They remain,
deep down, true believers in the power of government and of the state." Economist
Survey, supra note 93, at 18.
95. See En Mexico, solo 4 9 % favorece la democracia: encuesta de CIPIE, LA
JORNADA (Mexico City), Aug. 30, 1995.
96. CLEAVES, supra note 33, at 13.
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professions rather than the legal profession."97 Zamora points
out that a banking lawyer in Mexico City has much more in
common with a banking lawyer in New York than with a crimi-
nal defense lawyer across the city.98
According to Cleaves,
to the degree that professionals occupy positions commanding
state resources and are entrusted with the task of interpret-
ing official ideology, their influence will increase. Profession-
als will exercise influence through the state as increasingly
prominent members of the bureaucratic elite, and not on the
state as a relatively autonomous force in civil society.9
Thus, the most promising approach for public interest lawyering
is probably to infuse the state apparatus itself with legal profes-
sionalism. Again, quoting Cleaves, "[tlhe most articulate profes-
sional leaders in Mexico cite as criteria of professionalism a
commitment to social justice, rationality and efficiency, absti-
nence from illicit public sector gain, a strong work ethic, devel-
opment of techniques suited to national problems, and methods
to insure multi-class recruitment into the professional
ranks."'0
In this regard, it is important that at least one law school,
at the public Universidad Aut6noma Metropolitana (UAM), is
explicitly dedicated to the training of lawyers "oriented to public
service." Founded in 1975 in the aftermath of the 1968 student
protests against government suppression of political opposition,
the school has a curriculum designed with public sector lawyers
in mind. 1 ' According to 1990 figures for sixteen major public
universities in Mexico, UAM had by far the highest percentage
of full-time faculty. 102 In their first year, law students at UAM,
together with students in economics, sociology, and public ad-
97. Perry, supra note 45, at 175.
98. Stephen Zamora, Remarks to the Section on North American Cooperation,
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 4, 1996). Many
Mexican lawyers and even law professors have never heard of the Asociacidn
Nacional de Abogados Democrdticos.
99. CLEAVES, supra note 33, at 18.
100. Id. at 102.
101. See Fabricantes de Abogados, EL NAcIONAL, INSTANCIA (Mexico City), July
7, 1992, at 1, 8-9 (comments of Jorge Fernandez, director de la Division de Ciencias
Sociales de la UAM).
102. See LOURY, supra note 84, at 180-81.
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ministration, take interdisciplinary courses that confront the
realities of Mexican economic, social, and political life.1"3 Later
they can enroll in an exceptionally well-organized and well-su-
pervised live client clinical program, located in a specially de-
signed facility in a nearby poor neighborhood.'"°
Additionally, the private Academia Mexicana de Derechos
Humanos offers after-hours human rights training programs to a
mix of government lawyers, including prosecutors, and public
interest lawyers from non-governmental organizations.105
In fact, one may see evidence of a promising future for Mex-
ican public interest lawyering in the official National Human
Rights Commission. The Commission is staffed by idealistic
young lawyers, chosen by merit examination rather than by
political connections, who are willing to spend months living out
of suitcases as they conduct investigations throughout the coun-
try."° Created in 1990, the Commission has been criticized for
its lack of prosecutorial authority and limited jurisdiction, which
does not include violations of electoral and labor rights.1 7
However, it has recently exposed police torture of suspected
Zapatista leaders,"° found officials in the state of Guerrero
culpable in a police slaying of seventeen leftist campesinos,l°9
and investigated government tolerance of the illegal activities of
103. Fabricantes de Abogados, supra note 101, at 8 (descriptive materials on file
with author).
104. The author visited the clinic (bufete juridico) and spoke with several in-
structors (descriptive materials on file with author).
105. Interview with Sergio Aguayo, President, Academia Mdxicana de Derechos
Humanos, in Mexico City (June 30, 1993); Interview with Carol de Swaan, Executive
Director, Academia Mdxicana de Derechos Humanos, in Mexico City (July 7, 1993);
Gloria Ramirez, Program Officer for Education, Academia Mdxicana de Derechos
Humanos, in Mexico City (July 7, 1993) (descriptive material on file with author).
106. Interview with Lic. Victor Arequiano, Lawyer with the National Human
Rights Commission, in San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas (July 30, 1993); Dra.
Alicia Elena Perez Duarte, supra note 39.
107. See Sanchez, supra note 7, at 1052-55. See generally JORGE L. SIERRA
GUZMAN, COMISIN MXICANA DE DEFENSA Y PROMOCI6N DE Los DERECHOS
HuMos, LA CoMIsI6N NACIONAL DE DERECHOS HuMANOS - UNA VISION No
GOBERMENTAL (1992).
108. See Sara Silver, Government Denies Zapatista Rebels Tortured to Confess,
AP, Feb. 9, 1996; Police in Mexico Accused of Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1996, at
A4.
109. See Anthony DePalma, 17 Police and 4 Officials Arrested in Mexican Peas-
ants Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, at A6; Raul Garcia, Cuatro son ex
colaboradores del gobernador Figueroa Alcocer; el resto, policias, LA JORNADA (Mexico
City), Jan. 11, 1996.
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private police forces (guardias blancas) in six Mexican
states. 110
Obviously, non-governmental lawyers must be available to
contest major presidential policies, if they are to be contested at
all. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice has agreed to
hear a constitutional challenge to the army's displacement of
civil authority in Chiapas where no declaration of a state of
emergency was ever made."' Four Mexico City law professors,
including a former president of ANAD, brought the action.11
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the Human Rights
Commission's recommendations concerning the Guerrero massa-
cre, the noted political scientist, Sergio Aguayo, remarked that
Jorge Madrazo, the current President of the Commission, "se ha
convertido en el Ombudsman que muchos esperdbamos.""' I
believe that the Commission's kind of public interest lawyering
is also what Mexico has been hoping for.
110. See Triunfo Elizalde, Cunden guardias blancas, LA JORNADA (Mexico City),
Jan. 15, 1996. Guardias blancas is the name given to private police forces employed
by local strongmen. Last year, a priest in Puebla was almost lynched for sermon-
izing against official tolerance of ranchers who used guardias blancas to assassinate
and evict local Indians. See Priistas intentaron linchar a un cura en Puebla, LA
JORNADA (Mexico City), Nov. 8, 1995.
111. See Jesus Aranda, Diaz Romero atenderd la demanda para determinar la
constitucionalidad, LA JORNADA (Mexico City), Aug. 7, 1995.
112. Id.
113. Sergio Aguayo Quezada, El Ombudsman que esperabamos, LA JORNADA
(Mexico City), Aug. 16, 1995. In English: "He's turned into the Ombudsman we've
hoped for."
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